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THE PROBLEM OF THE ESSENTIAL ICON
Catherine Legg
1. Icon, Index and Symbol
Charles Peirce made a well-known dis-
tinction between icons, indices and symbols. 
These are three kinds of signifi cation—spe-
cifi cally, three kinds of relationship between 
a sign and its object. I use the term ‘signi-
fi cation’ instead of terms more familiar in 
analytic philosophy of language such as 
‘representation’ or ‘reference’ in an attempt 
to loosen an apparent near-exclusive hold of 
the spoken and written word on many phi-
losophers’ thinking about meaning, which is 
relevant to our topic. The icon/index/symbol 
distinction has already been much investi-
gated by Peirce scholars,1 but a brief summary 
will be helpful. 
Icons signify objects by resembling them.2 
For example, a map of Australia signifi es the 
continent of Australia by being of the same 
shape (however roughly). One of Peirce’s 
defi nitions of the icon states that its parts 
should be related in the same way that the 
objects represented by those parts are them-
selves related.3 One might call this form of 
resemblance “structural resemblance,” and 
the perspicuous representation of relations 
via structural resemblance is one of the 
icon’s greatest strengths. There are obvious 
links here to the early Wittgenstein’s “Pic-
ture Theory of Meaning,” with the caveat 
that one may distinguish between structural 
and properly pictorial resemblance insofar 
as there are structural mappings which are 
not good pictures. As Peirce notes, “Many 
diagrams resemble their objects not at all in 
looks; it is only in respect to the relations of 
their parts that their likeness consists.”4 The 
famous London Tube Map does not exactly 
represent the paths of its train-lines—it has 
been regularized, and is a more effective icon 
for that. On the other hand every pictorial 
resemblance is a structural resemblance, so 
structural is a generalization of pictorial re-
semblance. Of course the Tractatus is gnomic 
enough about meaning to leave it open that 
structural rather than pictorial resemblance 
is what Wittgenstein meant too. 
Is all iconic resemblance structural re-
semblance? This claim is too strong; there 
might also be “simple icons.” For instance, 
a particular color might be used to signify a 
girl who is wearing a dress of that color, or 
whose personality arguably possesses some 
shared qualities (for example ‘sunniness,’ or 
‘intensity’). Such cases, as well as structural 
resemblance, are covered by what is arguably 
Peirce’s most general defi nition of iconicity, 
which will be used here: “An icon is a sign 
fi t to be used as such because it possesses the 
quality signifi ed.”5
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Indices (or ‘indications’) signify objects 
paradigmatically by being ‘physically’ 
connected with them (via causation or co-
presence). Thus, for instance, smoke is an 
index of fi re, and ‘here’ is an index of the 
place at which I stand and utter the word.6 
However the category generalizes to all 
brutely dyadic sign-object relationships. 
The meaning of ‘brutely’ in brutely dyadic 
is ‘unmediated,’ in a number of senses which 
will now be explained. 
To those trained in analytic philosophy of 
language, these dyadic relationships may 
seem to fall into two separate categories. The 
fi rst consists in brutely dyadic relationships 
between signs and objects ‘in the world.’ 
Under this heading the category has much in 
common with what is often referred to as “di-
rect reference,” embracing demonstratives7 
and the ostensive designation of natural kinds. 
The analytic philosopher naturally wants to 
extend ostensive designation of natural kinds 
to embrace ‘rigid’ designation more gener-
ally. This is a tricky issue, though, insofar as 
Peirce does not develop a detailed possible 
world semantics of the kind familiar today.8 
However at least some of what is arguably the 
purpose of rigid designation, to capture the 
way in which ‘meanings ain’t in the head,’ 
was covered by Peirce in terms of a distinc-
tion between the so-called ‘immediate’ and 
‘dynamic’ objects of a given sign.9 Proper 
names might seem an obvious addition to 
this list. However, as has been noted,10 our 
English, grammatical proper names are not 
‘logically proper names.’ Although they 
may function indexically at some initial 
baptism, they are wont to be used more than 
once—they are not very useful otherwise. If 
used repeatedly they become symbols (to be 
defi ned below).11 
What might seem to be a second category 
of Peircean index consists in brutely dyadic 
relationships of coreference between two 
signs. Under this heading fall relative pro-
nouns, anaphora, and bound variables (argu-
ably a formal-logic analogue of the previous 
two cases). It should be acknowledged that 
‘indexicality’ is not always viewed in main-
stream analytic philosophy of language as 
covering such phenomena. For instance, Perry 
argues that indexicals should be distinguished 
from anaphora.12 Perry and Kaplan argue that 
demonstratives should be thought of as a 
distinct sub-class of indexicals because some 
further ‘demonstration’ in context is needed 
to secure the reference of ‘that,’ unlike more 
classical indexicals such as ‘I.’ Nevertheless, 
the brute dyadicity of the relationship is the 
key feature Peirce wished to capture with 
his notion of the index. He saw the relevant 
‘semiotic natural kinds’ as most fruitfully 
carvable in such numeric terms. 
To be exact, his formal characterization of 
the icon/index/symbol distinction proceeds 
via the ‘essential adicity’ of the relation by 
means of which the sign designates its object. 
Iconicity is essentially monadic insofar as 
the quality (whether simple or structural) by 
means of which an icon resembles its object 
is something that the icon would possess 
whether or not the object existed. (A cloud 
shaped like Richard Nixon would have the 
same shape if Nixon had never existed.) By 
contrast indexicality is essentially dyadic, 
as a footprint, for instance, would not exist 
without the foot which planted it, and there is 
no such thing as a ‘one-place anaphor.’
Symbols, then, are essentially triadic. They 
signify objects via some kind of (further, 
independent) convention or rule. This con-
vention is ‘arbitrary’ (in Saussure’s sense) 
and must be learned. There is no real reason 
that the word used to signify Australia to its 
English-speaking inhabitants should begin 
with ‘A.’ But it does, and we must learn this 
to use it correctly. It is this rule or convention 
which mediates the reference of a symbol 
to its object, by contrast to the unmediated 
index. Most English words are symbols, and 
further examples are musical notes on a page, 
and amber traffi c lights. 
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It is important to note that a symbol’s 
conventional nature makes its signifi cation 
general, because conventions are “general 
rules to which the organism has been sub-
jected,”13 and general rules can be applied any 
number of times in situations which display 
the appropriate (general) features. This is not 
true of the other two sign-types. Indices des-
ignate particular existence—Peirce writes, 
“[a]n indexical word . . . has force to draw 
the attention of the listener to some hecceity 
common to the experience of speaker and 
listener.”14 Some contemporary authors as-
sign to indexicals similar pragmatic roles in 
particular contexts.15 Icons designate neither 
general facts nor particular existences. They 
possess a mode of signifi cation which is dif-
fi cult to isolate in unmixed form and which 
Peirce sometimes describes enigmatically as 
‘a pure dream.’16 This raises the interesting 
questions of why and how such a form of 
signifi cation might be of any use to anyone, 
which will be addressed. 
These three categories are not mutually 
exclusive: a given sign may fall into more 
than one. For instance, a footprint is both 
index insofar as it is caused by an actual push 
by a foot, and icon insofar as it has the foot’s 
shape. The internationally recognized sign 
which directs drivers to the airport is both 
icon insofar as it looks somewhat like an aero-
plane, and symbol insofar as it doesn’t look 
very much like an aeroplane, and we have 
been taught to associate it with the imminence 
of an airport (rather than, say, an aeroplane 
factory). Finally, a shadow clock indexes the 
time insofar as the actual movement of the 
sun highlights a specifi c point on the dial, 
but symbolically designates it insofar as only 
numerals on the dial state what the time actu-
ally is. In this respect temporal words, such 
as ‘now,’ are not terribly different. ‘Now’ 
indexes a particular time by virtue of being 
uttered at that time, but it is a symbol insofar 
as one needs to learn (in English) that it is the 
phoneme ‘now’ which plays that function.
Despite this tendency for the three catego-
ries of signs to mix, Peirce claims they are 
irreducible to one another, and each plays a 
unique and vital role in thought. In an arrest-
ing if metaphorical remark he likened sym-
bols to living tissue in the body of thought, 
indices to the skeleton “which holds us stiffl y 
up to . . . realities,” and icons to the blood 
which “with its swift changes supplies the 
nutriment for the main body.”17 And all three 
work together in real-world reasoning:
Suppose a man to reason as follows: The Bible 
says that Enoch and Elijah were caught up into 
heaven; then, either the Bible errs, or else it is 
not strictly true that all men are mortal. What 
the Bible is, and what the historic world of 
men is, to which this reasoning relates, must 
be shown by indices. The reasoner makes some 
sort of mental diagram by which he sees that 
his alternative conclusion must be true, if the 
premise is so; and this diagram is an icon or 
likeness. The rest is symbols; and the whole 
may be considered as a modifi ed symbol. It is 
not a dead thing, but carries the mind from one 
point to another.18
2. Defining the Question
Symbolic signifi cation has never been invis-
ible to analytic philosophers. It was taken for 
granted for most of the twentieth century, due 
to the aforementioned focus on the spoken 
and written word, that all signifi cation takes 
this form—so taken for granted that explicit 
argument for it is hard to fi nd. As is often the 
case, highlighting of the assumption arrived 
with its fi rst major challenge. In the 1970s 
mainstream analytic philosophy of language 
caught up with Peirce in discovering ‘the 
essential indexical.’19 John Perry sketched a 
so-called “doctrine of propositions,” the ac-
cepted wisdom which he claimed was refuted 
by recognition of essential indexicality. Perry 
blames the ‘doctrine’ on Frege, and its key 
claims for our purposes are: 
i) Propositions (qua object of belief) 
“have a truth-value in an absolute 
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sense, as opposed to merely being true 
for a person or at a time” 
ii) Propositions are individuated via ‘con-
cepts.’20
These claims conjure a model of language 
as comprised entirely of de dicto, general 
propositions built compositionally from ‘con-
cepts’ which correspond in Peirce’s terms 
most closely to symbols. For Perry equates 
them with Fregean senses, which are abstract 
objects. Their abstractness means they cannot 
be indices. If they have an iconic character 
(that is, somehow possess intrinsic qualities 
which resemble what they signify) then this 
was not mentioned by Frege in “On Concept 
and Object,” nor by his descendents, except 
the early Wittgenstein, whose originality so 
often led him to perceive possibilities missed 
by other philosophers.21 But the analytic tradi-
tion did not follow Wittgenstein in this, pos-
sibly because an intrinsic iconic character of 
concepts seems a necessarily obscure posit. 
Thus concepts are usually naively thought 
to signify what they do (when the question 
is considered at all) merely because of some 
arbitrary general rule, whether this consists in 
relatively plastic Humean ‘custom and habit’ 
or something more hard-wired in us and akin 
to natural law, and the possibility that there 
might not be a one-size-fi ts-all solution for 
how concepts signify is rarely considered.
That Perry’s ‘concepts’ are in fact symbols 
can also be seen by the role they play in his 
argument against the doctrine of proposi-
tions. The argument revolves around cleverly 
constructed scenarios where it seems that one 
cannot explain someone’s actions in terms of 
their beliefs unless the beliefs are somehow 
‘essentially indexical.’ In the most famous, 
Perry chases a mystery shopper around the 
supermarket trying to tell him that he has a 
torn sack of sugar spilling out of his trolley, 
fi nally stopping because he realizes that the 
shopper with the torn sack is him. One can-
not explain his stopping without attributing 
to him the belief of the form “I am making a 
mess,” Perry claims. 
He considers the idea that the ‘I’ might 
be shorthand for some “concept which I 
alone ‘fi t,’” for instance, “the only bearded 
philosopher in a Safeway Store West of the 
Mississippi”—call this description ‘A.’ He 
then rejects this, for it does not explain why 
he stopped to say that he realized something 
of the form, “I came to believe A is making 
a mess,” if he doesn’t believe that the person 
who uniquely fi ts A is him.22 This makes it 
clear that A fails because of its generality 
which, as noted, pertains only to the symbol. 
For if A is general then Perry can mistakenly 
believe he doesn’t satisfy A, or he can believe 
that he satisfi es A but not know that he is the 
only person who satisfi es A, or it might even 
be the case that there is no description which 
would uniquely identify him, even under 
conditions of complete general knowledge 
(conjuring a nightmare world of qualitatively 
identical philosophers pushing torn sugar-
sacks around symmetrical supermarkets).
To sum up, a “classical” (or “pre-Perry”) 
formal semantics for analytic philosophers 
may be defi ned as follows.23 Assuming that L 
is our language, and U is the set of all existent 
things (frequently assumed to exhaust real-
ity), and I is an interpretation function which 
connects every constant in L with an element 
in U, and assigns to every predicate in L the 
appropriate subset of U, then a sentence φ in 
L is true iff every individual denoted by the 
sentence does lie in the extension of the predi-
cate in L to which it is assigned by the inter-
pretation function. Every factor relevant to the 
truth-conditions (and thereby, it was thought, 
the meaning) of a sentence was envisaged to 
be made explicit in such a theory.
However, now that essential indexicality 
is now pretty much a given in mainstream 
analytic philosophy, formal semantics has 
accreted some epicycles. Roughly following 
David Kaplan,24 reality is envisaged to consist 
not only of a set U of individuals, but also a 
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set W of (possible) worlds, and a set C of 
contexts. These contexts are possessed of 
features such as times, locations (both intra- 
and inter-world) and ‘agents.’25 In Kaplan’s 
infl uential way of putting it, the meaning of 
indexical terms such as ‘I’ consists in a cer-
tain character, which takes into account the 
particular context in which the indexical is 
uttered, in order to deliver an overall content 
to a proposition. Thus character is a function 
from contexts to contents: for instance, ‘I’ is 
a function whose value at any context is the 
context’s agent. The interpretation function 
now not only assigns constants and predicates 
in L to elements and sets of elements in U 
respectively, but also performs further re-
markable tasks, such as delineating a context 
of utterance, determining a unique ‘agent’ for 
that context, and mapping the reference of ‘I’ 
onto that agent—not only in this world but 
all other possible worlds in which it might 
be appropriate to say that that ‘same agent’ 
appears. This new semantics has given rise to 
a “two-dimensional modal logic” whereby a 
‘secondary intension’ corresponds to content, 
and a ‘primary intension’ to character. 
The above discussion raises the question of 
the third term in Peirce’s trichotomy of icon, 
index and symbol. Is there an ‘essential icon’? 
If so, what would be an example? Could any 
thought-experiments be framed which exhibit 
the irrefutable clarity of Perry chasing his trail 
of sugar around the supermarket because he 
lacked the irreducibly indexical information 
that the sugar-spiller was him? This issue is 
as yet pretty much untouched in analytic phi-
losophy of language, and considering it opens 
up a series of intriguing questions.
The fi rst question is of course, is there 
such as thing as an ‘essential icon’? Answer-
ing this will require getting clear on what 
might be meant by ‘essential’ here. Should 
it be the same kind of essentiality that the 
essential indexical has? If not, how might it 
be different? If there is such a phenomenon, 
further questions arise. For instance: How 
widespread is it? Is it possible to specify 
precisely what information icons signify in 
particular cases, or specify in any interesting 
and principled way the kinds of information 
they might signify in general? Finally, what 
if any challenges to contemporary analytic 
formal semantics might the phenomenon 
put forward? For instance, should it be com-
plicated still further to introduce functions 
whose parameters are icons? How would that 
work? Do we need a 3D modal logic? What 
would that look like?
3. What is ‘Essential’ about the 
‘Essential Indexical’?
Despite strenuous use in centuries of meta-
physics, in contemporary practice the word 
‘essential’ is often unhelpfully vague. Essen-
tial indexicality might be explicated thus:
EssIn1: Certain signs are ‘essentially index-
ical’ in that indexical signifi cation is their 
sole function (i.e., they play no symbolic 
or iconic role). 
However this interpretation can be ruled out 
right away. For as has been seen, according 
to Peirce, all words have some symbolic 
character insofar as their meanings must 
be learned, although they may be indices 
also—and of course ‘I’ is a word. Also, care-
ful reading of “The Problem of the Essential 
Indexical” does not suggest that the above 
is what Perry has in mind either. Rather, it 
would appear that the “essential indexical” is 
not essential simpliciter but, rather, essential 
for something.
For what? Perry suggests that it is essential 
to explain a person’s behavior in terms of his 
beliefs. In the supermarket he stopped his cart 
because he came to believe the sugar-spiller 
was him. At times Perry seems to suggest 
that in this case his relevant belief can only 
be expressed using the specific word ‘I,’ 
speaking of:
the importance of the word “I” in my expression 
of what I came to believe. When we replace it 
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with other designations of me, we no longer 
have an explanation of my behavior.26
This might seem to suggest that essential 
indexicality consists in a claim such as:
EssIn2: Some specifi c terms have an ir-
reducibly indexical dimension to their 
signifi cation [i.e., wherever they are used]
‘Irreducibly indexical’ here means that a 
sign’s meaning cannot be fully expressed in 
iconic or symbolic signs. Note the difference 
between this claim and the claim in EssIn1, 
that the sign is purely indexical. Prime can-
didates for such signs are of course, “Here,” 
“now” and “I” (and, for those who follow 
David Lewis, “actual”).27
However does indexicality pertain purely to 
certain key terms in this way? Perry seems to 
argue for this by claiming that if, rather than 
using the word ‘I,’ he had said, ‘in the manner 
of De Gaulle,’ “John Perry is making a mess,” 
the explanation of his behavior would fail:
I would no longer have explained why I stopped 
and looked in my own cart. To explain that I 
would have to add, “and I believe that I am John 
Perry,” bringing in the indexical again.28
But one might ask: to whom is this explana-
tion being given? For instance, imagine Perry 
turning to his wife in the supermarket and 
saying, “Honey, I stopped the cart because I 
realized that John Perry was making a mess.” 
Surely this would explain his behavior to her 
(although she might wonder why he is being 
so pompous). What notion of explanation is 
being invoked here? Perry says little about 
this. 
Also it seems wrong to say that indexicality 
pertains to specifi c terms if those same terms 
might be used non-indexically. For instance, 
I might fancifully choose to call my house 
‘here,’ and then (while not in my house) make 
a statement such as, “Here was built in 1910.” 
To those who understood that I was talking 
about my house I would not be referring to 
the place in which I uttered the statement. So 
it seems a simple list of terms will not suffi ce 
to explicate indexicality.
Here is another way of formulating the 
claim:
EssIn3: Some propositions have an ir-
reducibly indexical dimension to their 
signifi cation. 
Sometimes Perry seems to lean towards this 
interpretation—for instance towards the end 
of the paper where he distinguishes belief 
states (expressible via sentences with unre-
solved indexicality) from real-world objects 
of belief, and suggests that the true moral 
of “the problem of the essential indexical” 
might be that there is no such thing as de 
dicto belief.29 Overall, though, he confl ates 
the two claims, speaking only of a ‘missing 
conceptual ingredient.’30
Turning to iconicity, then, there are three 
possible analogous claims:
EssIc1: Certain signs are ‘essentially 
iconic’ in that iconic signifi cation is their 
sole function (i.e., they play no symbolic 
or indexical role). 
EssIc2: Some specifi c terms have an ir-
reducibly iconic dimension to their signi-
fi cation.
EssIc3: Some propositions have an irreduc-
ibly iconic dimension to their signifi cation.
Once again, EssIc1 will be set to one side 
as not the true target.31 How then are Es-
sIc2 and EssIc3 to be investigated? Peirce’s 
example of the three sign-types functioning 
together suggests that the icon’s role is to 
portray logical structure. (“The reasoner 
makes some sort of mental diagram by 
which he sees that his alternative conclu-
sion must be true, if the premise is so”). 
Logic, then, would seem to be where es-
sential iconicity should be sought. Thus 
this claim will also be considered:
EssIc4: Some arguments have an irreducibly 
iconic dimension to their signifi cation. 
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Interestingly, Peirce and Gottlob Frege—
arguably the two greatest formal logicians of 
the nineteenth century—took a keen inter-
est in logical notation, and at various times 
endeavored to make theirs as perspicuous as 
possible. Although early in his career Peirce 
made many innovations in algebraic logic—
including the discovery, with his student 
Mitchell, of predicate logic independently 
of Frege—shortly afterwards he invented 
a diagrammatic logical notation which he 
called his “Existential Graphs,” and claimed 
was his logical ‘chef d’oeuvre.’32 This will 
be discussed in section 6. However there is 
gathering evidence that Frege also was aware 
of, and working with, iconic dimensions of 
his own notation. This will be discussed in 
section 5. First, however, the next section, 
4, will present an outline of an expressivism 
recently put forward by Robert Brandom, 
which will provide helpful background. After 
that, sections 7 and 8 will return to our three 
key claims concerning ‘essential’ iconicity 
in order to determine whether they are true, 
and the paper will fi nish with some general 
conclusions in section 9.
4. Brandom’s Expressivism
In his books Making It Explicit and Ar-
ticulating Reasons Brandom introduced a 
new and important expressivism to the phi-
losophy of language, whose point is to deny 
that, in some sense, semantics can be made 
fully explicit. He sources the position in the 
Romantic period when, he claims, new at-
tention was paid to signifi cation as a process 
of expressing (“the process by which inner 
becomes outer when a feeling is expressed 
by a gesture”33), as opposed to a process of 
representing (understood as the transparent 
statement of independent fact). In the former 
the mind is seen as more active, in the latter, 
more passive. Brandom generalizes the view 
from a ‘Romantic’ to a ‘Rationalist’ expres-
sivism, by viewing ‘expression,’ famously, 
“as a matter not of transforming what is inner 
into what is outer but of making explicit what 
is implicit.”
Making content explicit consists in putting 
into propositional form at least some of its 
inferential role, the moves in the language 
game which it makes possible. In thus 
transforming practices into statements, the 
process is given a pragmatist twist insofar 
as, Brandom claims, it frequently consists in 
“turning something we can initially only do 
into something we can say.”34 This is a form 
of pragmatism whose key idea is that ‘know-
ing that’ is subordinate to ‘knowing how,’ 
in contrast to the approach of contemporary 
mainstream epistemology.35
It is important to note that not all examples 
of expressivist ‘sayings’ are ‘linguistic 
sayings.’ Consider musical notation, for 
example. Making music is a set of practices 
transmitted for most of human history via 
direct person-to-person copying of actions. 
However during the Renaissance, innovators 
developed a system of notation which enabled 
music to be reproduced without face-to-face 
transmission, thereby making explicit on a 
written page what was previously only im-
plicit in performance. 
Brandom makes a profound point about 
how under expressivism the relationship 
between the implicit and the explicit should 
be understood. One cannot assume that mak-
ing a practice explicit consists in translation 
of a ‘content’ that is antecedently defi nable 
(explicitly): 
[W]e need not yield to the temptation . . . to 
think of what is expressed and the expression 
of it as individually intelligible independently 
of consideration of the relations between them. 
. . . And the explicit may not be specifi able apart 
from consideration of what is made explicit.36
The musical case is a plausible example of 
this. A sonata’s musical score is surely not 
(wholly) intelligible independently of an 
understanding of sonatas qua musical perfor-
mances. On the other hand, the reverse claim, 
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that sonatas might be unintelligible without 
musical notation seems less plausible.37 
Crucially, this demonstrates that the explicit 
is parasitic on the implicit in a way that does 
not hold vice versa. 
One of Brandom’s most interesting philo-
sophical moves (for which he credits Sellars) 
is to self-consciously highlight the practice 
of philosophy itself qua ‘Socratic method,’ 
as the pulling of unselfconscious implicit 
practices into explicit statements that might 
be critically appraised.38 A crucial example of 
this philosophical practice is, of course, for-
mal logic. Failure to appreciate this, Brandom 
suggests, has led to confusion and mistaken 
views about ‘the semantics of logic,’ such 
as the view that formal logic describes a sui 
generis set of facts. Rather, it should be seen 
as a way of saying what we are doing when 
we actually make inferences in ways that 
guide us to make further inferences without 
fear of going wrong.
Can all logical form be made explicit? 
For a representationalist, if logical form is 
part of ‘everything that is the case,’ and the 
widespread applicability of logic would seem 
to provide some argument that it is, why 
shouldn’t this be possible? For the expres-
sivist, however, it would appear not. Always 
some logical form must elude being trans-
formed from ‘doing’ into ‘saying,’ given that 
the transformation from doing into saying is 
itself a doing. It was noted that the process 
of ‘making it explicit’ is refl exive—surely 
for this very reason it must always be incom-
plete? However one must be careful with the 
quantifi er scope within this claim. The claim 
is not that some specifi c content cannot be 
made explicit, merely that whenever some 
specifi c content is captured and made explicit, 
some further specifi c content remains in prac-
tice as a necessary condition for the success 
of the capture, albeit that that practice is now 
open for its own further capture.39 This was 
arguably Lewis Carroll’s point in his puzzle 
of ‘Achilles and the Tortoise,’ which will be 
discussed further below. 
Once again the early Wittgenstein saw fur-
ther than many of his contemporaries here, 
drawing his famous distinction between what 
can be ‘said’ and what can only be ‘shown.’40 
This raises the following question. Must all 
Brandomian expressivism be (as suggested 
by Brandom) a pragmatist expressivism—a 
saying of what was previously only done? Or 
might expressivism be generalized still fur-
ther? Might it equally cover saying what was 
previously only shown? Might Wittgenstein’s 
Picture Theory of Meaning be properly 
located in the expressivist tradition? This 
question will be pertinent to our investiga-
tion into the essentiality, or not, of the icon. 
With Brandom’s expressivism outlined, its 
relevance to Frege’s logical notation will now 
be explored.
5. Iconicity in Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift
Danielle Macbeth41 has introduced an 
intriguing new expressivist interpretation 
of Frege’s ‘concept script.’ She claims it is 
not (as is almost universally understood) 
an early clumsy attempt to realize standard 
quantificational logic, but an expressive 
alternative to it, at least partly by virtue of 
certain iconic qualities. Before discussing 
this claim, it should be noted that delicate 
issues arise here with respect to Frege’s 
logicism. Frege’s logicism may usefully be 
understood as the attempt to eliminate appeals 
to intuition in the basic proofs of arithmetic. 
A comparison with Kant is instructive here. 
John MacFarlane42 has argued that although 
Frege’s higher-order quantifi ers and skolem 
functions can be expressed in Kant’s logical 
system, this can be done only by using non-
logical constructions which only make sense 
with respect to a faculty of ‘intuition,’ which 
presents our minds with something ‘sensible’ 
about which it forms judgments. Frege was 
THE PROBLEM OF THE ESSENTIAL ICON / 215
dissatisfi ed with this, being always terribly 
worried about allowing the possibility of error 
to creep into proof, via ‘logical gaps.’ Thus 
Ed Zalta writes:
Frege saw himself very much in the spirit of 
Bolzano (1817), who eliminated the appeal to 
intuition in the proof of the intermediate value 
theorem in the calculus. . . . A Kantian might 
very well simply draw a graph of a continuous 
function which takes values above and below 
the origin, and thereby ‘demonstrate’ that such 
a function must cross the origin. But . . . [t]here 
are good reasons to be suspicious about such 
appeals: (1) there are examples of functions 
which we can’t graph or otherwise construct for 
presentation to our intuitive faculty . . . (2) once 
we take certain intuitive notions and formalize 
them in terms of explicit defi nitions, the formal 
defi nition might imply counterintuitive results; 
and (3) the rules of inference from statements to 
constructions and back are not always clear.43
Crucially, Frege denies Kant’s claim that 
without sensibility no object would be given 
to us.44 Rather, he claims that we can “grasp” 
objects qua analytic statements which govern 
the extensions of concepts (a good example 
being the numbers). 
Given all this, one would think that more 
than any other logician Frege should leave 
no role in his logical notation for the iconic. 
But things are not so simple according to 
Macbeth. I will now sketch some of the iconic 
features she attributes to Frege’s notation, 
then discuss how they might be reconciled 
with the logicism just outlined.
i) The 2D Conditional
In Begriffsschrift a sentence such as, “If the 
sun is shining then John is happy,” may be 
represented thus:
It is usually considered that this notation’s 
only (trivial) virtue is that it “enables us to 
dispense with brackets.”45 However Macbeth 
claims that Frege’s notation captures mean-
ing not expressible linearly. First, the way 
the antecedent ‘hangs off’ the consequent 
represents that the consequent is true under 
the condition represented by the antecedent. 
Furthermore, Frege’s notation suggests that 
the consequent (the ‘conditioned’) is more 
important than the antecedent (the mere 
‘condition’), by placing it fi rst, i.e., highest. It 
should be noted that these iconic features are 
not purely iconic, however, insofar as other 
graphical means could have been devised 
to signify the same things. For instance, 
the consequent’s relative importance could 
equally be signifi ed by placing it to the left 
of the antecedent. Insofar as Frege’s choice to 
use ‘up’ rather than ‘left’ needs to be learned, 
the convention is symbolic. 
More profound and more purely iconic ex-
pressivities may be discerned in the represen-
tation of complex conditionals. In his mature 
logic, Macbeth argues, Frege recognized that 
his notation allows all logically equivalent 
linear formulations of complex condition-
als to be represented at once. Consider for 
example:
S ⊃ (R ⊃ (Q ⊃ P))







This very same diagram may then be read as:
S ⊃ ((R & Q) ⊃ P) 
by analyzing it as, “(P on two conditions, 
namely Q and R) on condition that S.” Similar 
analyses can produce the following variant 
readings (also logically equivalent):
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(S & R) ⊃ (Q ⊃ P)
(S & R & Q) ⊃ P)46
which “must be proven in standard (one-di-
mensional) notation.”47 This renders Frege’s 
notation essentially 2D, Macbeth argues, 
since “corresponding to it are a variety of 
provably equivalent serially ordered linear 
structures.”48
Furthermore, Frege’s conditional notation 
can be thought of as a resource not just for 
analyzing sentences into logically equivalent 
variants, but also for abstracting from sen-
tences arbitrarily complex logical structures, 
and generalizing them.49 For instance, the fol-
lowing may be regarded as defi ning a unique 
ternary connective:
it was there to be discerned; but it is selected 
from among many different if equally discern-
ible patterns. . . . Thus it would in principle 
be possible to grasp the thought expressed by 
“Brutus killed Brutus” without noticing that 
it exhibited a pattern shared by ‘Cato killed 
Cato,” but not by “Brutus killed Caesar”: it is 
by noticing that common pattern that we attain 
the concept of suicide.50
How is the pattern which “Brutus killed 
Brutus” shares with “Cato killed Cato” (as 
opposed to the pattern it shares with “Brutus 
killed Cato”) discerned? It must be seen, as 
structures are. In this way, Frege claimed, 
deduction is not necessarily a mechanical 
thought-process, but can be highly creative. 
Dummett writes:
Since the form of the analysis was not uniquely 
determined by the content of the sentence 
analyzed, deductive reasoning must therefore 
be, in some part, a creative intellectual opera-
tion. All this put Frege almost alone amongst 
philosophical logicians, in possession of an 
account of how deductive reasoning could be 
simultaneously certain and fruitful.51
It will be demonstrated that Frege was joined 
in this ‘account’ by Peirce.
One fi nal point lends even greater power 
and generality to Frege’s logic. This is that, 
as was not evident in the example above, 
the alternative analyses into ‘function’ and 
‘argument’ which a Begriffsschrift sentence 
makes possible may in fact identify functions 
and arguments at different ‘logical levels.’ 
For instance, Macbeth cites the fi rst law of 
Begriffsschrift.
Similarly, the following may be regarded as 




The way in which Frege’s notation makes 
it possible to recognize arbitrarily logically 
complex new concepts (and then to generalize 
them to create new thoughts) was in fact one 
of the major advances of Fregean predicate 
over the old Aristotelian logic. It’s worth em-
phasizing that the same sentence may yield 
different Fregean analyses without being 
ambiguous. As Dummett has pointed out:
The analysis of a sentence enables us to discern 
a pattern in the sentence, a pattern it shares with 
every other sentence resulting from inserting 
an argument into the argument-place of the 








She claims that it may be understood as ex-
pressing that a fi rst-level relation of the fol-
lowing form holds between propositions:
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If Macbeth is correct, it might seem that 
a contradiction looms. On the one hand it 
would appear that Frege wants to remove all 
‘sensible objects’ from arithmetic via logical 
analysis. On the other hand he appears to be 
mining the possibilities of his own logical 
notation for enabling its users to see new 
analytic possibilities. How do these claims fi t 
together? One might try to argue that some 
of Frege’s most profound logical steps were 
taken despite himself and his offi cial doctrine. 
However such concessions are unnecessary. 
It was noted that making meaning “explicit” 
consists in translating inferential practice into 
propositional form. Perhaps then it might be 
argued that Frege’s logicism consists not in 
endeavoring to make every step in mathemati-
cal reasoning explicit, but in endeavoring to 
make every step visible. 
Although it might seem prima facie that 
these should be the same goal, they are really 
not. For instance, Frege argues for his 2D 
notation by stating, “a simple sequential or-
dering in no way corresponds to the diversity 
of logical relations through which thoughts 
are interconnected.”54 Macbeth explicates this 
remark by pointing out that even a simple 2D 
structure such as a multiplication table can be 
presented in linear form in a number of differ-
ent ways, (for example, row by row, column 
by column, all values in the table in numeri-
cal order, and so on), such that, “each linear 
presentation of the information contained in 
the table highlights some relationships while 
it obscures others.”55 Similarly, although as 
noted one can view the Fregean graph:
but it may equally be understood as express-
ing that a second-level relation of the follow-
ing form holds between any two concepts and 
two objects:
What do these two instances of the ‘law’ 
have in common? Once again, it appears that 
all that can be said is: something structural, 
which can be seen in the diagrams above. 
Even the apparently trivial diagram: 
may be read as claiming that the fi rst-order 
concept H(x) applies to the object j, or that the 
second-order concept of instantiation holds 
between the fi rst-order concept H(x) and the 
object j. Macbeth goes so far as to say that 
sentences represented in Frege’s notation 
have a main connective only relative to an 
analysis. In Frege’s own words: 
[T]he thought itself does not yet determine what 
is to be regarded as the subject. If we say ‘the 
subject of this judgment’ we do not designate 
anything defi nite unless at the same time we 
indicate a defi nite kind of analysis.52
Frege claims that with the Begriffsschrift 
one is “stepping outside the confi nes of a 
spoken language designed to be heard and 
moving into the region of a written or printed 
language designed for the eye.”53 This sug-
gests not only that there was a developing 
iconic dimension to his notation, but also that 











as claiming that the fi rst-order concept H(x) 
applies to the object j, or that the second-
order concept of instantiation holds between 
the fi rst-order concept H(x) and the object j, 
one cannot take both perspectives at the same 
time, on pain of incoherence. Likewise, one 
can view the fi rst law of Begriffsschrift as a 
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claim in propositional logic, or in predicate 
logic, but not at the same time. Thus it is 
precisely because Frege cannot make every-
thing explicit that he has to make it visible. 
As noted, under expressivism the mind which 
produces and understands signs is seen as 
active rather than passive with respect to 
the content it produces and understands. It 
may be seen how in this way Frege is true to 
a Kantian legacy which is missed by many 
analytic philosophers.
It might be argued that Frege’s real problem 
with the use of ‘intuition’ in Kantian arith-
metic was that it is a non-logical intuition56 
(for instance, drawing on evidence from the 
senses). In other words, Frege’s quarrel was 
really with Kant’s claim that mathematics is 
synthetic. Thus for instance, in Begriffsschrift 
Part III, §23, he writes:
Through the present example . . . we see how 
pure thought, irrespective of any content given 
by the senses or even by an intuition a priori 
can, solely from the content that results from 
its own constitution, bring forth judgments that 
at fi rst sight appear to be possible only on the 
basis of some intuition.57
The astute reader may now ask: Does that 
mean that one can have analytically true 
icons? A quick but facile answer would be: 
how could one have synthetically true icons? 
What fact does, say: ‘Δ’ represent to be true? 
We saw that Peirce made the enigmatic claim 
that unlike symbols, which signify general 
realities, and indices, which signify particular 
existences, icons signify ‘a pure dream.’ We 
now start to glimpse some of what this might 
mean. The more careful answer, though, 
would be that iconic signs are not yet capable 
of truth or falsity at all. Truth-values, with 
their general implications for thought as a 
whole, can pertain only to symbols.
At any rate, a sense of the iconicity in 
Frege’s logical notation, and some of the 
expressive resources it opens up, are now 
on the table. The next section will similarly 
investigate Peirce’s existential graphs, before 
returning to the overall questions regarding 
“essential” iconicity. 
6. Peirce’s Existential Graphs
Peirce claimed that a good logical icon has 
parts which are related in the same way that 
the objects represented by those parts are 
themselves related. As noted, he developed 
his existential graphs to try to realize this, 
writing:
[The] purpose of the System of Existential 
Graphs . . . [is] to afford a method (1) as 
simple as possible (that is to say, with as small 
a number of arbitrary conventions as possible), 
for representing propositions (2) as iconically, 
or diagrammatically and (3) as analytically as 
possible.58
The graphs have now been well-explored by 
formal logicians,59 but not as yet considered 
in relation to our question. 
First of all, unlike Frege, Peirce was of-
fi cially not a logicist. He saw mathematics 
and logic as distinct sciences with distinct 
aims and methods, although he did make the 
metaphorical remark that they are, “standing 
at the same place in the road, looking in dif-
ferent directions.” He distinguished them by 
claiming that whereas mathematics is “the 
science that draws necessary conclusions,” 
logic is “the science of drawing necessary 
conclusions.”60 What this subtle difference 
of expression amounts to in practice is that 
whereas mathematicians are interested in as 
quick and effi cient a calculating technique as 
possible, in order to reach as many interesting 
and useful necessary conclusions as possible, 
logicians want to break down proofs into as 
many intermediate steps as possible, for the 
process itself is their object of study.61
It is often wondered how a pragmatic 
theory of meaning, with its empiricist orien-
tation, accounts for meaning in mathemat-
ics. However for Peirce mathematics is as 
experimental a science as physics. However, 
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mathematics experiments on diagrams. I will 
now outline some of the graphs’ key features. 
For simplicity’s sake I will only discuss 
Peirce’s propositional logic system—his 
‘alpha graphs.’
i) Conjunction
Conjunction is represented iconically by 
two propositions being ‘scribed’ side by 
side:
~A
Arguably the cut iconically represents the 
dualism (utter diremption) in classical logic 
between truth and falsehood. The graphs’ 
equivalent of Double Negation (that when a 
proposition has two cuts around it they may 
both be removed) iconically ‘brings back’ 
the doubly negated proposition to ‘join’ other 
true propositions. 
iii) The Scroll (Conditional)
Peirce uses a combination of the signs for 
conjunction and negation to represent the 
conditional, dubbed ‘the scroll’:
 
  A         B 
 
(A & B)
Interestingly, in Peirce’s fi rst try at a graphi-
cal logic system, the so-called “Entitative 
Graphs,” the juxtaposition of propositions 
represented disjunction. However, he soon 
switched, for interestingly notation-driven 
reasons. For, as Shin points out, the only 
way that (A & C) can be true is for A and C 
to be true in the same situation, whereas (A 
∨ C) can be true by A being true and C false, 
or by A being false and C true, or by both A 
and C being true, and thus, “we will never 
get a picture of the situation in which the 
disjunctive fact . . . is displayed.”62 Insofar 
as it is forced, then, the choice to use juxta-
position to signify conjunction may be seen 
as purely iconic. More generally, we can see 
how necessity concerning the use of signs is 
becoming our criterion of their being iconic 
rather than symbolic.
ii) The Cut
Negation is represented by scribing an oval 
line (a “cut”) around a section of the sheet 






  A               
 
C A 
This simultaneously represents the equivalent 
(A ⊃ C), and (~A ∨ C) and ~(A & ~C). As 
for complex conditional propositions, if three 
scrolls are nested to graph S ⊃ (R ⊃ (Q ⊃ P)), 
this produces:
 
S R Q P 
However ‘double scrolls’ are visibly equiva-
lent to double negation. They thus may be 
removed:
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which clearly represents: (S & R & Q) ⊃ P), 
picking up the intermediate cases on the way. 
Shin calls this feature of Peirce’s graphs the 
“Multiple Carving Principle,”63 and praises 
it for some of the same reasons as Macbeth 
praises Frege’s notation:
Importantly, in the Alpha system we see logical 
equivalence. It is more effi cient to see that the 
resulting graphs are the same graphs than to 
fi nd a deduction sequence from one sentence 
to the other. . . . EG’s Alpha system has fewer 
syntactic devices than propositional languages, 
but without suffering from the inconvenience 
of a symbolic system with only two connec-
tives.64 
Thus Peirce like Frege saw that some 
graphical logical notations enable their users 
to see logical relations not clearly capturable 
in linear form. Relatedly, he also recognized 
the rich potential for creative choice in de-
ductive inference, and claimed that it derived 
from creative observation:
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on 
the one hand, mathematics is purely deductive 
in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodicti-
cally, while on the other hand, it presents as rich 
and apparently unending a series of surprising 
discoveries as any observational science. The 
truth, however, appears to be that all deductive 
reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves 
an element of observation; namely, deduction 
consists in constructing an icon or diagram the 
relations of whose parts shall present a complete 
analogy with those of the parts of the object of 
reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in 
the imagination, and of observing the result so 
as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations 
among the parts.65
However Peirce arguably went further than 
Frege in recognizing a distinction between 
a kind of deduction that is creative and a 
kind that is not, and seeking to give a prin-
cipled account of the difference. To this end 
he distinguished between ‘theorematic’ vs 
‘corrollarial’ deduction. What specifi cally 
distinguishes the former from the latter is a 
step whereby one adds new material to the 
graph and then experiments on it. An example 
(cited by Jay Zeman) is Euclid’s proof that 
the interior angles of a triangle total to 180 
degrees:
Let us then ask how we go about proving a 
basic but non-trivial proposition of Euclidian 
geometry. . . . So long as we just look at the 
triangle, making no changes in our diagram, we 
also make no progress in our proof. But when 
we move to the construction of a line parallel 
to a base through the opposite vertex, we see 
that propositions involving parallel lines solve 
the problem. The construction is by no means 
implied by the problem or by the postulates of 
geometry, but it is permitted by them.66
 
S R Q P 
It has been argued that what Kant was trying 
to express by saying that mathematics is syn-
thetic was really that it consists in theorematic 
rather than corrollarial deduction.67
7. Is Iconic Logic Merely of 
Heuristic Value?
Our key claims concerning essential ico-
nicity were:
EssIc2: Some specifi c terms have an irreduc-
ibly iconic dimension to their signifi cation.
EssIc3: Some propositions have an irreduc-
ibly iconic dimension to their signifi cation. 
EssIc4: Some arguments have an irreducibly 
iconic dimension to their signifi cation. 
Figures ©New Zealand Ministry of Education, Wellington, 
New Zealand. Obtained from http://www.nzmaths.co.nz/
geometry/shape/anglesetc.aspx.
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Considering EssIc4 first, do Frege and 
Peirce’s notations show that it is true? One 
might argue that although the iconic features 
of these notations render them easier to work 
with, or perhaps useful to teach logic, noth-
ing new is provable in them—and thus the 
iconicity is not essential. 
This raises interesting issues about the role 
of formal logic—is the main or sole role of 
a formal logic system to prove as many new 
results as possible? Also, what do we mean 
by ‘provable’? A distinction may be made 
between:
i) ‘Strict provability.’ There are proofs per-
formable using (at least some) icons which 
could not be proven in a system which only 
uses indices and symbols—no matter how 
complex the proof.
ii) ‘Likely provability.’ There are proofs 
performable using (at least some) icons which 
could be proven in a system which only uses 
indices and symbols, but the proofs would 
be so complex, long, or otherwise diffi cult 
to think about that logicians would be more 
likely to discover the iconic proofs. 
If it is asserted, ‘nothing new is provable 
in graphical logical notations,’ and mean-
ing i), the claim is that any logical structure 
expressed iconically could be expressed en-
tirely by means of indices and symbols. But 
could it? Lewis Carroll’s well-known fable of 
Achilles and the Tortoise68 is pertinent here. 
In the fable, famously, the two mythical racers 
contemplate the following propositions:
(A) Things that are equal to the same are 
equal to each other. 
(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things 
that are equal to the same. 
(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal 
to each other. 
The Tortoise asks Achilles what he would 
say to someone who claims that he accepts 
A) and B) to be true, but not Z). He invites 
Achilles to imagine that he (the Tortoise) is 
such a person and to “force him, logically, 
to accept Z) as true.” This is something the 
Tortoise should of course accept, as Z) is in 
fact entailed by A) and B). However Achilles 
fi nds he has surprising trouble achieving this 
task. He devises another conditional, C), to 
express what he sees as manifestly true and 
as missed by the Tortoise:
(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true. 
He states C) to the Tortoise. Interestingly, 
the Tortoise asks him to write it down. Once 
Achilles has done so, the Tortoise asks what 
difference the writing on the paper makes to 
what he should do (specifi cally, re. inferring 
Z)), even if he accepts the truth of A) and B), 
because he just doesn’t see it. Achilles is once 
again dumbfounded and is forced to resort to 
the further conditional D):
(D) If A and B and C are true, Z must be 
true.
The Tortoise of course asks him to write down 
D), and then refuses to act on it by performing 
the inference from A), B) and C) to Z). The 
two sink into a manifest infi nite regress, with 
the Tortoise still unconvinced. 
What is missing? What is the Tortoise not 
‘getting’ (or pretending not to)? Arguably 
(once again) a structural relationship. This 
time, however, the structural relationship 
somehow connects a conditional sentence 
written on a page to an actual inference, which 
is an action. (The structural relationship thus 
may also be referred to as a ‘norm’). If one 
pauses and thinks about this for a moment, 
it is rather amazing. How do perceived struc-
tures lead to actions? What is this “hardness 
of the iconic must”? Those who understand 
how to use written conditionals know how 
to ‘see’ the necessary connection between 
written conditional and inference-act, but the 
Tortoise can be understood as rhetorically 
highlighting a logical gap between a logical 
diagram and our seeing how to use it by refus-
ing to see and use it himself.69 There are links 
here to Wittgenstein’s rule-following prob-
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lem, insofar as Wittgenstein uses a similar 
feigned incompetence to highlight the logical 
gap between past uses of a rule and its future 
interpretation, and insofar as it seems that, 
rather baffl ingly, there is nothing one can do 
to force him to see what he is missing.70
Brandom wrote that if expressivism is cor-
rect, “the explicit may not be specifi able apart 
from consideration of what is made explic-
it.”71 The insight seems to hold in this case, 
for if the Tortoise does not have the practice 
of Modus Ponens (as he appears not to, or 
pretends not to), Achilles cannot ‘specify’ to 
him how to attain that implicit knowledge of 
how to act merely by further explicit words 
in his rapidly fi lling notebook. It should be 
obvious that what is true for Modus Ponens 
may be generalized to all argument forms, 
and the norms by means of which we under-
stand what to do with them.
Thus EssIc4 is true, and true in a stronger 
form:
EssIc4*: All arguments have an irreducibly 
iconic dimension to their signifi cation. 
From this it follows that in the Peircean con-
text, the phrase “symbolic logic” is something 
of a misnomer. All representation of logical 
structure is iconic. Consider for instance the 
following argument in algebraic logic:
∀x (Hx ⊃ Mx), Hs ∴ Ms
We ‘see’ the validity of this argument by a 
process akin to mentally substituting Hs into 
the conditional (universally instantiated) and 
obtaining Ms via Modus Ponens (given that 
we know how to use it). Concerning algebra, 
Peirce writes:
[T]he very idea of the art is that it presents for-
mulae which can be manipulated, and that by 
observing the effects of such manipulation we 
fi nd properties not to be otherwise discerned. 
In such manipulation, we are guided by previ-
ous discoveries which are embodied in general 
formulae. These are patterns which we have the 
right to imitate in our procedure, and are the 
icons par excellence of algebra.72
This is very different to how we understand 
symbols, because our algebraic manipulations 
are at least in part dictated by the structure of 
the algebraic patterns themselves, (and thus 
necessary) rather than dictated by convention 
(and thus arbitrary). Such reasoning is only 
possible with icons, as of the three sign-
classes, only they possess internal structure. 
In this way, then structural articulation may 
be understood to be the source of all neces-
sity. The “hardness of the iconic must” con-
sists only in our unavoidable recognition of 
a structure as having the particular structure 
which it does in fact have. What else could 
it consist in? Those philosophers who worry 
(as many do) about “the place of normativ-
ity in a naturalistic world order”73 might do 
well to look further here. One of the few to 
suggest a positive solution to this issue of the 
source and authority of logical normativity is 
Brandom. He argues that Kant’s concept of 
positive freedom holds the key, insofar as it 
teaches that binding oneself to logical norms 
may paradoxically result in a bonanza of 
positive expressive freedom—a freedom to 
say things which would be impossible with-
out the scaffolding which logic’s structural 
articulation provides.74 
But one might protest, surely conventions 
might be devised to capture the rules of alge-
bra, and this would enable us to signify them 
symbolically? Against this Peirce argues that 
such symbolic signifi cation could only be 
parasitic on a prior iconic understanding: 
[A] general formula, such as (x+y)z = xz+yz 
. . . [might] be replaced by an abstractly stated 
rule (say that multiplication is distributive); 
but no application could be made of such an 
abstract statement without translating it into a 
sensible image. 75
Of course the point just made with respect 
to algebraic logic holds equally for arguments 
in ordinary English, for instance:
All human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being 
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Therefore, Socrates is mortal
Again, one sees that this is valid by some 
thought process of the nature of seeing 
Socrates as somehow ‘included’ in some 
kind of conglomeration of human beings, 
who exemplify the property of mortality, 
thereby rendering it the case that Socrates 
must be mortal. That even this qualifi es as 
experimenting on a mental diagram can be 
seen by the use of the key word ‘must.’ 
To sum up, then, the difference between ar-
guments written in English, in standard quan-
tifi cational logic, and in Peirce’s or Frege’s 
graphs, is merely a matter of how perspicuous 
the icons are,76 in other words, how much of 
the use of these notations is ‘forced’ via the 
constraints of their structure. Thus in formal 
logic, the true distinction should not be drawn 
between ‘symbolic’ and ‘iconic,’ but between 
‘algebraic’ and ‘graphical’ systems. From this 
it follows that Peirce’s and Frege’s graphs 
cannot prove arguments that are un-provable 
in non-iconic logical systems, as there are no 
such systems. Thus the graphs can deliver at 
most provability in the sense of ii) (‘Likely 
Provability’). However given the fact that all 
logical structure is iconic, this benefi t should 
not be underestimated. Peirce claimed:
The aid that the system of graphs . . . affords to 
the process of logical analysis, by virtue of its 
own analytical purity, is surprisingly great, and 
reaches further than one would dream. Taught 
to boys and girls before grammar, to the point 
of thorough familiarization, it would aid them 
through all their lives.77
8. Iconic Propositions, Iconic Terms
EssIc3 is now looking trivially true, given 
that a conditional proposition is, functionally 
speaking, a mini-argument. However, iconic 
propositional structure is not restricted to 
conditionals. Turning once again to the early 
Wittgenstein, the Picture Theory of Meaning 
highlights that a meaningful proposition is not 
just a concatenation of concepts. For instance, 
it matters which concepts serve as predicate 
and which as argument(s). The order of the 
arguments also matters greatly.
Wittgenstein notes that a proposition’s 
concepts must be arranged in an appropriate 
structure (in our terms: icon), in order that it 
can be seen what is the case if it is true (“It 
is only insofar as a proposition is logically 
articulated that it is a picture of a situation.”78) 
It is necessary that we be able to ‘see’ what 
is the case if a proposition is true, for us to 
be able to judge whether a proposition is 
true (“A proposition constructs a world with 
the help of logical scaffolding, so that one 
can actually see from the proposition how 
everything stands logically if it is true”79). 
This ‘picturing’ also explains how we are 
able to understand and reason with false 
propositions,80 and it is hard to think of how 
we would explain this any other way. 
Concepts must also be arranged in an ap-
propriate icon to guarantee that they picture a 
genuinely possible state of affairs, rather than 
nonsense. For many possible concatenations 
of concepts are in fact nonsensical. With these 
insights Wittgenstein effectively devastated 
Russell’s 1913 theory of knowledge which 
was based on analyzing a judgment in terms 
of a mere list of concepts. For instance, the 
logical form of “Othello judges that Desde-
mona loves Cassio” was analysed by Russell 
as: Judges(Othello, Desdemona, Cassio, 
loves), whereas previously he had analysed 
it as a relation between a subject and a whole 
proposition (whose structural integration was 
thus a given).81 As Wittgenstein puts it:
Every right theory of judgment must make 
it impossible for me to judge that “this table 
penholders the book” (Russell’s theory does 
not satisfy this requirement).82
“Table” “penholder,” and “book” are all wor-
thy concepts, but the putative judgment above 
makes no sense. But according to Russell’s 
theory, it could be judged by someone.
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Wittgenstein goes so far as to try to subsume 
entirely into a proposition’s iconic structure 
its predicates (which led him to claim that he 
had disproven ‘the reality of relations’), the 
logical types of its constituents and also its 
‘logical constants’:
Symbols are not what they seem to be. In “aRb” 
“R” looks like a substantive but is not one. What 
symbolizes in “aRb” is that R occurs between 
a and b. . . . This is the fi rst thing that indicates 
that there may not be logical constants.83
[E]very theory of types must be rendered super-
fl uous by a proper theory of symbolism.84
This aspect of the Picture Theory of Mean-
ing has not been widely emulated—possibly 
because as mentioned earlier the posited 
iconic structure seems necessarily mysteri-
ous. However arguably the mystery arises 
from the juxtaposition of the Picture Theory 
with logical atomism, and the real problem 
lies with the latter. For it is logical atomism 
which leads Wittgenstein to see the separa-
tion between what can be ‘said’ and what 
can ‘shown’ as two entirely distinct camps 
of content. Whereas the earlier explication of 
expressivism stated that with a simple shift 
in quantifi er scope one may claim simultane-
ously that every piece of content which is ex-
plicit (‘said’) relies crucially on some content 
which is not explicit (‘shown’), and that every 
piece of content may be made explicit—or at 
least more explicit than it was before. Martin 
Lefebvre has pointed out that although after 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein abandoned the 
atomism that led him to see propositions 
as pictures composed of ‘simple objects,’ 
he maintained iconicity as a foundation of 
propositional representation in his later work 
where he turned to explicating language via 
rules and language games.85 For what glues 
the multitude of scattered and disparate in-
stantiations of adding into a ‘plus rule,’ or 
of checkmating into ‘the game of chess,’ but 
their resemblance to one another? Thus:
EssIc3*: All propositions have an irreducibly 
iconic dimension to their signifi cation.
What then of terms? Surely these are 
language fragments suffi ciently devoid of 
internal structure that they need not be iconic 
(though they obviously can be—consider 
for example onomatopoeia). Predicates will 
be considered fi rst, and then singular terms. 
From a Peircean perspective, the meaning of 
predicates also must have an iconic dimen-
sion. This arises from the fact that, pace 
Quine and his many descendents, predicates 
do not just refer to (sets of) things, they en-
able inferencing. Christopher Hookway puts 
it thus:
Peirce often tells us that predicates, in natural 
and artifi cial languages, function as diagrams. 
This is refl ected in the fact that we can . . . 
advance our knowledge further by ‘experi-
menting’ on sentences in accord with logical 
laws. This exploits the fact that the inferential 
relations between sentences can be analogous 
to real elements between elements of reality, 
norms of inference matching laws of nature.86
Such a ‘conceptual icon’ is schematic, but it is 
no less useful for that (in fact it is more useful 
for that). Consider for instance the predicate 
“is gold.” One does not understand it unless 
one can make at least some inferences con-
cerning such matters as its typical behavior 
and appearance. Moreover, this inferential 
pattern must be distinctive enough to make 
a ‘conceptual signature’ which can reliably 
distinguish gold from other elements. Witt-
genstein would call this conceptual signature 
a ‘physiognomy.’ The insight is of course not 
restricted to scientifi c predicates. Consider 
Perry’s common-or-garden predicate, “is 
making a mess.” One doesn’t understand this 
unless one can make certain inferences—at 
least that its instantiators are in some way 
creating greater disorder in their surroundings 
of a kind likely to attract disapproval.
Discussion of the claim that propositional 
structure is iconic showed that it explains how 
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one is able to ‘see’ what would be the case if 
a proposition were true or false. If predicates 
are also iconic, what does that explain one’s 
‘seeing’? Unlike propositions, not complete 
states of affairs (which either obtain or do 
not), but rather an open-ended multiplicity 
of possible states of affairs which partially 
overlap at relevant general features. To put the 
same point another way: unlike propositions, 
predicates are not pictures so much as parts of 
pictures. But a part of a picture is still iconic, 
by virtue of the way in which we understand 
it—by recognizing which picture(s) it is a part 
of. In science this ‘predicate-seeing’ is vital 
to explain the generation of new hypotheses. 
In Peircean terms, new hypotheses can be un-
derstood as adding new ‘lines’ to the mental 
diagram which is a scientifi c theory, enabling 
new experiments to be performed upon it. 
Thus all predicates signify iconically. What 
then of singular terms? Surely they cannot all 
be icons? Defi nite descriptions will of course 
be iconic insofar as they rely on predicates to 
defi nitely describe what it is that they defi -
nitely describe. But surely there must be some 
pure pointing going on in language? What 
about proper names? It was noted earlier 
that although these may function indexically 
at some initial baptism, if used repeatedly, a 
general convention is established to refer to 
that individual by that term, and they become 
symbols. Could these not be an entirely ico-
nicity-free pure index/symbol combination? 
They may be, but one must ask: how are these 
names recognized at future uses (in order to 
become symbols)? Usually by the pattern 
of the letters or sounds which constitute the 
name. And a pattern is of course an icon. 
Thus Peirce writes:
A proper name, when one meets with it for the 
fi rst time, is existentially connected with some 
percept or other equivalent individual knowl-
edge of the individual it names. It is then, and 
then only, a genuine Index. The next time one 
meets with it, one regards it as an Icon of that 
Index. The habitual acquaintance with it hav-
ing been acquired, it becomes a Symbol whose 
Interpretant represents it as an Icon of an Index 
of the Individual named.87
The aforementioned excessive focus of ana-
lytic philosophers on symbols, which signify 
via arbitrary convention, has led them to treat 
‘material qualities’ of a sign, such as a word’s 
letters, as entirely irrelevant to its signifi ca-
tion. But of course this way of thinking is 
inappropriate to the icon. Once again these 
insights seem also to have been glimpsed by 
Wittgenstein, with his unmatched sensitivity 
to the phenomenology of language-use (albeit 
somewhat fancifully, perhaps):
While any word . . . may have a different char-
acter in different contexts, all the same there 
is one character—a face—that it always has. 
It looks at us.88
If Peirce’s defi nition of the icon is recalled, 
what is required for a term to be entirely 
iconicity-free is that it not refer to its object 
by means of any of its qualities whatsoever. 
This is a stringent request. As we have just 
seen, it will not be satisfi ed by any name or 
noun which is distinguished by a unique word. 
Some cases of signifi cation do approach this 
condition, however. Consider for example the 
word ‘that’ used by someone pointing a fi nger 
near an object and saying, “Look at that!”89 
But such uses are as rare as Russell’s ‘logically 
proper names.’ Therefore we may assert:
EssIc2*: Almost all terms have an irreducibly 
iconic dimension to their signifi cation.
6. Conclusion
Thus EssIc2, EssIc3 and EssIc4 are all 
true, and true in stronger form than initially 
proposed. The essential indexicals literature 
demonstrated to analytic philosophers that 
the real connection between a discourse and 
a world, that determines ‘what we’re talking 
about,’ cannot always be made explicit in that 
discourse. This fractured modal logic into at 
least two dimensions insofar as grasp of the 
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‘character’ of a proposition leaves one blind 
to its ‘content’ without resolution of the ob-
jects of its indexicals. The response has been 
to add to the interpretation function extra 
bells and whistles that locate actual speakers, 
places, and times in all worlds (at an appropri-
ate, context-dependent level of fi ne-grained-
ness, the context on which this is dependent 
being somehow identifi ed in a non-circular 
way), and serve them up somehow as part of 
the ‘content’ of propositions. Now we have 
just seen that iconicity is also ‘essential,’ and 
cannot be made entirely explicit (although it 
can be made more or less visible, in contrast 
to the pure pointing function of the index). 
What the implications of this should be for 
standard analytic semantics will need much 
further work to determine. However, for now 
we can conclude that Brandom’s expressiv-
ism is further vindicated in its claim that not 
all semantics can be made explicit. Earlier 
it was asked whether Wittgenstein’s Picture 
Theory of Meaning might belong in the ex-
pressivist tradition, and thus our understand-
ing of “making it explicit” might be extended 
from a saying of what was previously only 
done, to a saying of what was previously 
only seen. It can now be seen that the Picture 
Theory does indeed belong in that tradition. 
An interesting neglected continuity between 
it and Wittgenstein’s later work on rules is 
also now visible, insofar as the resemblance 
of the different instantiations of a rule or of 
a family-resemblance concept to one another 
cannot be reductively analysed. 
But at the same time it can be seen that this is 
not really an extension of expressivism. For as 
has been argued, in working with iconic signs 
the mind is not passive, but active. The rational 
mind binds itself to logical structure, and must 
respect it, but at the same time it chooses to 
analyze, to make explicit and to use these icons 
in a host of different ways, not all of which 
are cognizable together. As Wittgenstein said, 
all seeing is seeing-as. And of course every 
‘seeing-as’ presupposes the possibility of a 
‘seeing-not-as.’ In this way, then, a seeing is 
a doing. As Wittgenstein also noted:
An aspect is subject to the will. If something 
appears blue to me, I cannot see it red, and it 
makes no sense to say “See it red”; whereas 
it does make sense to say, “See it as . . .” And 
that the aspect is voluntary (at least to a certain 
extent) seems essential to it.90
The essentiality of the icon is thus revealed 
as creative inferential choices somehow at 
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